October Term 2025 in review

A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to meet his accusers face to face may not be denied without case-specific findings of necessity, notwithstanding Mississippi’s right-to-screening statute, Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g).

The Fourth Circuit departed from the principle of party presentation and abused its discretion in granting a new trial.

Because a State lacks the power to confer immunity from federal causes of action, the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s judgment that a plaintiff’s federal claims are barred by a Louisiana statute immunizing health care providers from civil liability during public health emergencies is reversed.

Title 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion for postconviction relief, and §2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.

Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both 18 U. S. C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions—therefore, one act that violates both may spawn only one conviction; the part of the Second Circuit’s judgment that held otherwise is reversed.

Under the standard set in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400, the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside needs emergency assistance; that standard was met here.

As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.

Restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Delaware law requiring a plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to provide an affidavit from a medical professional attesting to the suit’s merit, Del. Code, Tit. 18, §6853(a)(1), conflicts with a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and does not apply in federal court.

Because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the award of a new trial based on reasoning that departed from the strict standards that govern the grant of federal habeas relief to prisoners convicted in state court prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court grants the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari and reverses the judgment below.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626, does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.

The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal exception, 28 U. S. C. §2680(b), can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.

Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods Market did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judgment in favor of Hain Celestial Group.

A trial court’s qualified conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the defendant’s testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony and does not violate the Constitution.

Because the Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18 (1940), provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable.

The Immigration and Nationality Act requires application of the substantial-evidence standard to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ agency’s determination whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the level of persecution under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(42)(A).

The New Jersey Transit Corporation is not an arm of the State of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Petitioner Gabriel Olivier’s suit seeking purely prospective relief—an injunction stopping officials from enforcing an ordinance in the future—can proceed, notwithstanding his prior conviction for violating that ordinance; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), does not hold otherwise.

Because the Second Circuit failed to identify a case where an officer using a routine wristlock on a protester after issuing a verbal warning, without more, was held to have violated the Constitution, Sergeant Jacob Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity; the Second Circuit’s contrary conclusion was erroneous.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant fails to report to a probation officer.

Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Colorado’s law banning conversion therapy, as applied to petitioner’s talk therapy, regulates speech based on viewpoint, and the lower courts erred by failing to apply sufficiently rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.

Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal aviation gas refining duties and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal officer removal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1).

Because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W., the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in finding Winston Hencely’s state-law tort claims preempted where the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor Corporation’s challenged conduct.

Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.

In a 42 U. S. C. §1983 suit challenging a subpoena issued by the New Jersey Attorney General demanding documents and donor information, First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing.

Because the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8, and that map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10 of the Act.

A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the Act. 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(2)(A).

Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan— i.e., the withdrawing employer’s share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits—do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date. 29 U. S. C. §§1391, 1393.

In action filed by the Havana Docks Corporation pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U. S. C. §6021 et seq., related to its property interest in the operation of docks at the Port of Havana, respondent cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government;” Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision to vacate and remand based on an issue the parties had not raised in the District Court violated the principle of party presentation, and its judgment is reversed.

The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.

A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.

In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.

When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

The Court of Appeals erred in considering post-trial DNA evidence when assessing whether the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that jailhouse informant Ozio’s testimony was immaterial to the jury’s verdict, because evidence not presented to the jury could not have influenced the jury’s verdict and therefore sheds no light on whether Ozio’s testimony influenced that verdict.

A showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain a disgorgement award under 15 U. S. C. §78u(d)(5) or §78u(d)(7).

Amarin has failed to state a claim for actively inducing infringement of its brand-name drug’s patented uses in violation of 35 U. S. C. §271(b), so its complaint cannot withstand Hikma’s motion to dismiss.

Because forfeiture orders issued under 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties’ legal obligations, and the FCC’s factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the FCC to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.

A defendant charged with knowingly falsifying a document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1519 must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred; the defendant cannot be tried in a different district where the investigation was located because no “conduct constituting the offense” happened there.

Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

To determine whether an omission of a claim in the bankruptcy context was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of the judicial estoppel doctrine, courts should look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the omission; the Fifth Circuit erred in narrowing its inquiry in this case to whether the debtor had knowledge of the underlying facts or a potential motive to conceal the claim.

Prosecution of Ali Hemani under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3)—for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance—is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking district court review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.

An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.

The Second Circuit exceeded its authority in holding that Hernandez is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1); no clearly established federal law required the trial court to instruct the jury about the rule that Justice Kennedy adopted in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U. S. 600, and the Second Circuit erred in holding otherwise.

Courts may not create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law under the Alien Tort Statute; neither the ATS nor the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 imposes liability for aiding-and-abetting offenses.

The Immigration and Nationality Act does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission.

The Helms-Burton Act, formally known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, §301, 110 Stat. 815, 22 U. S. C. §6021 et seq., abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not also satisfy one of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

State employees may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute such as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer private suits under the statute; the individual defendants in this case did not do so here, so Landor’s case cannot proceed against them.

The proper baseline for measuring “just compensation” following a fairly conducted tax sale is the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value; Isabella County did not violate the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause by failing to compensate the taxpayer for his property’s fair market value.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien “arrives in the United States” for purposes of 8 U. S. C. §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a) only when the alien crosses the border into the United States; the INA neither entitles an alien standing at the border in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.

Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims related to Temporary Protected Status (TPS); Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed because a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action exists: the current administration opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past and has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal.

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U. S. C. §136v(b), expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its Roundup products’ label.

Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Okello Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.

The federal election-day statutes—3 U. S. C. §1, 2 U. S. C. §§ 1, 7—do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days thereafter; nothing in the federal election-day statutes requires ballots to be received by election day.

The Federal Trade Commission’s for-cause removal provision, 15 U. S. C. §41, is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.

Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex; West Virginia and Idaho did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining female sports teams for biological females.

The Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions on a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates, 52 U. S. C. §30116(d), violates the First Amendment.

Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.